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BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: MARYLAND
CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES
As long ago as the reign of King Solomon, disputes have arisen over
which of two or more contending persons should be entitled to the custody of
a child.1 Child custody cases continue to present complex problems, not
because of any dissatisfaction with the accepted principle that the best
interests and welfare of the child should control custody, 2 but because of the
1. Solomon demonstrated his legendary wisdom by resolving a child custody
dispute:
Then the king said, "The one says, 'This is my son that is alive, and your
son is dead'; the other says, 'No; but your son is dead, and my son is the living
one."' And the king said, "Bring me a sword." So a sword was brought before
the king. And the king said, "Divide the living child in two, and give half to
the one, and half to the other." Then the woman whose son was alive said to
the king, because her heart yearned for her son, "Oh, my lord, give her the
living child, and by no means slay it." But the other said, "It shall be neither
mine nor yours; divide it." Then the king answered and said, "Give the living
child to the first woman, and by no means slay it; she is its mother." And all
Israel heard of the judgment which the king had rendered; and they stood in
awe of the king, because they perceived that the wisdom of God was in him, to
render justice.
1 Kings 3:23 (Revised Standard Version).
2. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 174-75, 372 A.2d 582, 585 (1977); 2 W. NELSON,
DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT §§ 15.01-.02 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as W. NELSON].
That the best interests of the child should be the paramount concern in child custody
cases is taken for granted today. However, until the nineteenth century, the
controlling factor was the patria potestas doctrine - the right of the father to the
custody and services of his children. See Brosky & Alford, Sharpening Solomon's
Sword: Current Considerations in Child Custody Cases, 81 DICK. L. REv. 683, 684-85
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Brosky & Alford]; Shepherd, Solomon's Sword: Adjudica-
tion of Child Custody Questions, 8 U. RICH. L. REv. 151, 158-59 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Shepherd]. The patria potestas doctrine lost strength during the nineteenth
century as American courts accepted the idea that children are not chattels owned by
their fathers. See Brosky & Alford, supra at 685. Under the parens patriae doctrine
(see discussion at note 4 infra) the courts began to realize that the child's rights and
interests should be protected. In a frequently cited opinion, Judge Brewer (later a
United States Supreme Court Justice) stated that "whether the courts will enforce the
father's right to the custody of the child will depend mainly upon the question
whether such custody will promote the welfare and interest of such child." Chapsky v.
Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 653 (1881).
The Maryland Court of Appeals recognized the child's interests as the
paramount concern at least as early as 1878. In Hill v. Hill, 49 Md. 450 (1878), the
court stated that "the welfare of the child is certainly the primary object to be
attained, and is not to be sacrificed or placed in jeopardy ... " Id. at 458. Despite the
enlightened approach taken by nineteenth century courts, subsequent Court of
Appeals cases continued to recognize the father as having a special interest in the
custody of his children. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter, 156 Md. 500, 505, 144 A. 490, 492
(1929); Boggs v. Boggs, 138 Md. 422, 429, 114 A. 474, 477 (1921) (support case
discussing the interrelationship between father's duty to support and right to
custody). The special interest of the father was based upon the theory that because he
alone had a duty to support his children, he had a correlative right to their custody
and services. Id. In 1929, however, the General Assembly enacted a statute that
(641)
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difficulty in applying the principle to specific situations. 3 In limited
circumstances American courts have wide discretion, under the doctrine of
parens patriae,4 to interfere with the family relationship and protect the
welfare of a child. This Comment will examine the discretion exercised by
provided that between parents, neither had a superior right to the custody of their
children:
The father and mother are the joint natural guardians of their minor child
and are equally charged with its care, nurture, welfare and education. They
shall have equal powers and duties, and neither parent has any right superior
to the right of the other concerning the child's custody .... Where the parents
live apart, the court may award the guardianship of the child to either of
them.
1929 Md. Laws, ch. 561, § 1 (codified as MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (Cum. Supp. 1929)
(current version at (Cum. Supp. 1977)). Although the clear import of the statute was
that the father's custody rights were not to be deemed superior to those of the mother,
the Court of Appeals continued in several cases to speak of the father's "natural
right" to the custody of his children. See, e.g., Sibley v. Sibley, 187 Md. 358, 362, 50
A.2d 128, 130 (1946); Piotrowski v. State, 179 Md. 377, 381, 18 A.2d 199, 200 (1941). In
1943, the court implicitly recognized that the remnants of the patria potestas doctrine
had been legislatively eliminated in Maryland. See Dunnigan v. Dunnigan, 182 Md.
47, 52-53, 31 A.2d 634, 636 (1943). In light of Dunnigan and article 72A, § 1, the court's
reference in Sibley v. Sibley, 187 Md. at 362, 50 A.2d at 130, to the father's natural
right to custody of his children cannot be justified.
3. See, W. NELSON, supra note 2, at § 15.01. For a discussion of the best interests
of the child principle, see note 2 supra and notes 50 to 69 and accompanying text
infra.
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (4th ed. 1951) defines parens patriae as:
"[flather of his country; parent of the country.... In the United States, the state, as
a sovereign - referring to the sovereign power of guardianship over persons under
disability .... " Parens patriae is the basis for the power of the state to affect the
custody of children. See Turner v. Melton, 194 Kan. 732, 735, 402 P.2d 126, 128 (1965).
See generally L. HOCHHEIMER, CUSTODY OF InFANTS § 2 (1899) [hereinafter cited as L.
HOCHHEIMER]; Brosky & Alford, supra note 2, at 684-85; Shepherd, supra note 2, at
159. See also Comment, Child Custody: Best Interests of Children vs. Constitutional
Rights of Parents, 81 DICK. L. REV. 733, 734 & n.2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Child
Custody]. The power, which English courts first articulated in the seventeenth
century, rests upon the theory that while natural law gives parents the right to the
custody of their children, a child, from the time of its birth, owes an allegiance to the
state, and the state has a reciprocal obligation to regulate the custody of the child
whenever necessary to protect the child's welfare. See Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351,
86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952).
By statute, Maryland equity courts have jurisdiction in child custody cases.
The statute reflects broad parens patriae powers:
(a) Jurisdiction of courts of equity. - A court of equity has jurisdiction
over the custody, guardianship, legitimation, maintenance, visitation and
support of a child. In exercising its jurisdiction, the court may:
(1) Direct who shall have the custody or guardianship of a child;
(2) Determine the legitimacy of a child ....
(3) Decide who shall be charged with the support and maintenance of a
child, pendente lite or permanently;
(4) Determine who shall have visitation rights to a child; or
(5) From time to time set aside or modify its decree or order concerning
the child.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-602 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES
Maryland courts in custody disputes incident to divorce and between
parents and third parties, focusing in both situations on the factors utilized
by the courts to ascertain the best interests of the child.5
CUSTODY DIsPuTEs ACCOMPANYING DIVORCE
In Davis v. Davis,8 the Maryland Court of Appeals examined two areas
that had been in a state of considerable confusion: the standard for
appellate review in child custody cases and the importance of adultery in a
custody award.7 In Davis, a husband was granted a divorce on the ground of
his wife's adultery.8 The trial court, however, awarded the wife custody of
the couple's six-year-old daughter because the child had lived alone with her
mother for almost two years prior to the decree, had adjusted to that
arrangement, had progressed well in school, and because the mother had not
engaged in extramarital sexual affairs for many months. 9 The trial court
apparently concluded that the wife's past affairs had not adversely affected
the little girl. The Court of Special Appeals reversed and awarded custody to
the father.10 Relying on two of its earlier decisions,11 the court determined
that in child custody cases
an appellate court is not bound by the clearly erroneous rule, Md. Rule
1086, but must exercise its own good judgment as to whether the
conclusion of the chancellor is the best one. In making this determina-
tion we, of course, accept the chancellor's factual findings but not
necessarily his conclusions.12
5. This Comment will not analyze adoption or custody matters incident to
neglect and abuse cases, although many of the considerations discussed are invoked
in those cases. See generally Shepherd, supra note 2, at 163-66 & 171-76. Also, the
Comment will not discuss the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, MD. ANN.
CODE art. 16, §§ 184-207 (Cum. Supp. 1977), an important device for discouraging
continuing controversies over the custody of a child, deterring abductions for the
purpose of obtaining custody awards, and avoiding relitigation in one state of the
custody decision of another state.
6. 280 Md. 119, 372 A.2d 231, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977).
7. See notes 16 to 36 and accompanying text infra.
8. John and Mary Davis married in 1958. When they separated in January,
1974, they had a fifteen-year-old son, a thirteen-year-old daughter, and another
daughter who was six. At that time, Mrs. Davis moved into an apartment and took
the youngest child, Leigh, with her. The two older children apparently preferred to
remain with Mr. Davis. In September, 1974, Mr. Davis filed for divorce a vinculo
matrimonii on the ground of Mrs. Davis' adultery, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24
(Cum. Supp. 1977), and requested custody of all three children. In her answer and
cross-bill, Mrs. Davis also sought custody of the three children. The trial court granted
Mr. Davis a divorce a vinculo matrimonii and awarded him custody of the two older
children. Custody of Leigh was awarded to Mrs. Davis. 280 Md. at 120-21, 372 A.2d at
231-32.
9. Id. at 130-31, 372 A.2d at 237.
10. Davis v. Davis, 33 Md. App. 295, 364 A.2d 130 (1976).
11. See Sartoph v. Sartoph, 31 Md. App. 58, 64, 354 A.2d 467, 471 (1976); Sullivan
v. Auslaender, 12 Md. App. 1, 3-5, 276 A.2d 698, 700-01 (1971).
12. 33 Md. App. at 301, 364 A.2d at 133. A Maryland circuit court judge presiding
over a domestic relations case is called a chancellor.
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In addition, the court noted the familiar presumption in Maryland law that
an adulterous parent is unfit to have custody.'3 The Court of Special Appeals,
using its own best judgment, concluded that the trial court's award of
custody to the mother was erroneous; she had not sustained the mandatory
burden of proving her repentance and the unlikelihood of a recurrence of the
"promiscuous" conduct. 14
Disagreeing with the Court of Special Appeals on the proper standard of
appellate review in child custody cases and on the importance to be attached
to the mother's previous acts of adultery, the Court of Appeals reversed.' 5 As
to the standard of review, the court admitted its decisions gave some support
to the notion that Maryland appellate courts could use their own sound
judgment in determining whether the chancellor awarded custody to the
appropriate party.1 6 In fact, pre-Davis decisions reveal that the court utilized
a variety of appellate review standards. Some cases suggested that the
appellate court could reverse the award of custody if it determined that the
chancellor, in applying the law to the facts, did not reach the "best"'7 or
"correct' 8s conclusion as to who was entitled to custody.' 9 Other cases
recognized the chancellor's ability to observe the demeanor and appearance
of the parties and witnesses and to judge their characters and influences on
the child. Those cases stated that the lower court's determination of custody
would not be disturbed unless "some reason," 2 "some sound reason," 21 or
"compelling reasons"2 2 required reversal or the trial judge "abused his
discretion. '2 3 In several cases, the Court of Appeals applied the "clearly
13. Id. See Shanbarker v. Dalton, 251 Md. 252, 257, 247 A.2d 278, 281 (1968);
Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md. 327, 331, 207 A.2d 481, 483 (1965); Wallis v. Wallis, 235 Md.
33, 36-37, 200 A.2d 164, 165-66 (1964); Bray v. Bray, 225 Md. 476, 482-83, 171 A.2d
500, 504 (1961); Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 358-59, 157 A.2d 442, 447 (1960).
14. 33 Md. App. at 302-03, 364 A.2d at 133-34; accord, Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349,
358, 157 A.2d 442, 447 (1960).
15. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Court of Special Appeals with
directions to affirm the decision of the trial court. 280 Md. at 132, 372 A.2d at 237.
16. Id. at 124-25, 372 A.2d at 234.
17. See, e.g., Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 188, 148 A.2d 387, 389 (1959); Butler
v. Perry, 210 Md. 332, 339-40, 123 A.2d 453, 456 (1956); cf. Ex parte Frantum, 214 Md.
100, 105, 133 A.2d 408, 411, cert. denied sub nom. Frantum v. Department of Pub.
Welfare, 355 U.S. 882 (1957) (adoption).
18. See Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 359, 157 A.2d 442, 448 (1960).
19. Cf. Bray v. Bray, 225 Md. 476, 484, 171 A.2d 500, 505 (1961) (award of custody
to father not disturbed because the court was "unable to say [the trial judge's] ruling
was erroneous"); Burns v. Bines, 189 Md. 157, 164, 55 A.2d 487, 490 (1947) (reversal of
lower court since Court of Appeals "unable to concur in [the trial court's] conclusion").
20. Andrews v. Andrews, 242 Md. 143, 154, 218 A.2d 194, 201 (1966); Sibley v.
Sibley, 187 Md. 358, 362, 50 A.2d 128, 130 (1946).
21. Kartman v. Kartman, 163 Md. 19, 23, 161 A. 269, 270 (1932).
22. Trudeau v. Trudeau, 204 Md. 214, 218, 103 A.2d 563, 564 (1954).
23. Pontorno v. Pontorno, 257 Md. 576, 581, 263 A.2d 820, 822 (1970); Kauten v.
Kauten, 257 Md. 10, 12-13, 261 A.2d 759, 761 (1970); Wood v. Wood, 227 Md. 112, 115,
175 A.2d 573, 575 (1961); Oliver v. Oliver, 217 Md. 222, 230, 140 A.2d 908, 912 (1958).
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erroneous" standard24 to review the chancellor's ultimate custody decision
as well as his findings of fact.25 Finally, some cases that appeared to apply a
"clearly erroneous" standard may in fact have applied a standard requiring
the appellate court only to find "error." Although the opinions referred to the
"clearly erroneous standard," in each case the court merely held that "the
trial court did not err. '26
In Davis, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the confusion in its prior
decisions and sought to define clearly the proper standard of appellate
review. The court for the first time delineated the three aspects of appellate
review of child custody cases: review of the trial court's findings of fact, its
statement of the law, and its application of the law to the facts. The Davis
court emphasized that the "clearly erroneous" standard 7 applies only to
factual findings. If the trial court erred on the law, further proceedings are
required unless the error was harmless. In reviewing the ultimate decision of
the trial court as to which party is entitled to custody, an appellate court
cannot reverse unless the chancellor clearly abused his discretion. 28 The
court repudiated the language of previous cases suggesting an appellate
"best judgment" rule;2 9 when judging from the facts who is entitled to
custody, the chancellor, not the appellate court, should have the ultimate
exercise of judgment unless it is abused,
because only he sees the witnesses and the parties, hears the testimony,
and has the opportunity to speak with the child; he is in a far better
24. See MD. R. P. 886 (Court of Appeals); MD. R. P. 1086 (Court of Special
Appeals). The rules are identical:
When an action has been tried by the lower court without a jury, this
Court will review the case upon both the law and the evidence, but the
judgment of the lower court will not be set aside on the evidence unless clearly
erroneous and due regard will be given to the opportunity of the lower court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses.
25. See Spencer v. Spencer, 258 Md. 281, 284, 265 A.2d 755, 756 (1970); DeGrange
v. Kline, 254 Md. 240, 243, 254 A.2d 353, 355 (1969); Cornwell v. Cornwell, 244 Md. 674,
678, 224 A.2d 870, 873 (1966); Winter v. Crowley, 231 Md. 323, 329, 190 A.2d 87, 91
(1963).
26. See, e.g., Hall v. Triche, 258 Md. 385, 386-87, 266 A.2d 20 (1970); Goldschmiedt
v. Goldschmiedt, 258 Md. 22, 26, 265 A.2d 264, 266 (1970). One Court of Special
Appeals case so interpreted Hall and Goldschmiedt. Sullivan v. Auslaender, 12 Md.
App. 1, 5, 276 A.2d 698, 700 (1971).
27. See note 24 supra.
28. 280 Md. at 125-26, 372 A.2d at 234.
29. Id. at 124-25, 372 A.2d at 234. In Sullivan v. Auslaender, 12 Md. App. 1, 3-5,
276 A.2d 698, 700-01 (1971), the Court of Special Appeals reviewed the Court of
Appeals cases and determined that it could exercise its own "best judgment" in
custody cases; the court concluded that because the ultimate award of custody is not a
purely factual determination, it was not subject to the clearly erroneous rule. The
court relied upon the language in Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 188, 148 A.2d 387,
389 (1959); Ex parte Frantum, 214 Md. 100, 105, 133 A.2d 408, 411, cert. denied sub
nom. Frantum v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 355 U.S. 882 (1957); Butler v. Perry, 210
Md. 332, 339-40, 123 A.2d 453, 456 (1956). The court observed that Hall v. Triche, 258
Md. 385, 386, 266 A.2d 20 (1970) and Goldschmiedt v. Goldschmiedt, 258 Md. 22, 26,
265 A.2d 264, 266 (1970) were not inconsistent with its conclusion.
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position than is an appellate court, which has only a cold record before
it, to weigh the evidence and determine what disposition will best
promote the welfare of the minor.30
The appellate cases using a "best judgment" rule to review a custody case
simply failed to take into account the obviously superior opportunity of the
chancellor to determine where the best interests of the child lay. The Davis
court properly rejected the reasoning of such cases and arrived at a rational
and amply supported standard of appellate review.31
The court then considered whether a parent who has committed adultery
should be presumed unfit to have custody of his or her child. A long line of
Maryland cases held that a presumption of unfitness arose from adultery
and that the adulterous parent had to make a "strong showing" to overcome
the presumption.32 The reasoning of the earlier cases is reflected in Hild v.
Hild 33
when a divorce is granted on the ground of adultery, the custody of the
child is usually awarded to the innocent party, not as a matter of
punishment or reward, but because it is assumed that the child will be
reared in a cleaner and more wholesome moral atmosphere .... We
think the past decisions of this Court require a strong showing to be
made to overcome the usual rule against awarding custody to an
adulterous mother. The fact that she subsequently marries the paramour
has not been regarded as meeting the requirements of such a showing.34
The presumption of unfitness, however, may be criticized on the ground that
it inhibits inquiry into the best interests of the child;35 if acts of a potential
custodian do not affect the well-being of a child, they should be irrelevant to
a custody determination. 36 An act of adultery may or may not have an
impact on a child or the relationship between the child and the parent. The
time, place, and circumstances surrounding the adultery determine the
effect, if any, on the parent's ability to raise the child. Only after the
30. 280 Md. at 125, 372 A.2d at 234.
31. See id.; W. NELSON, supra note 2, at § 15.50. See generally Weinman, The Trial
Judge Awards Custody, 10 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 721, 724 (1944); see also Kay &
Philips, Poverty and the Law of Child Custody, 54 CAL. L. REV. 717, 721-22 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Kay & Philips] ("abuse of discretion" described as the most
widely applied standard of appellate review in custody cases).
32. See, e.g., Shanbarker v. Dalton, 251 Md. 252, 257, 247 A.2d 278, 281 (1968);
Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md. 327, 331, 207 A.2d 481, 483 (1965); Wallis v. Wallis, 235 Md.
33, 36-37, 200 A.2d 164, 165-66 (1964); Bray v. Bray, 225 Md. 476, 482-83, 171 A.2d
500, 504 (1961); Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 358-59, 157 A.2d 442, 447 (1960).
33. 221 Md. 349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960).
34. Id. at 358, 157 A.2d at 447.
35. See Foster & Freed, Child Custody (pts. I & II), 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 429-31,
615, 626-27 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Foster & Freed].
36. See Podell, Peck & First, Custody - To Which Parent? 56 MARQ. L. REV. 51,
66 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Podell, Peck & First]; Child Custody, supra note 4, at
739-42.
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chancellor fully explores the facts can he ascertain this effect. No basis
exists for presuming unfitness.
The Court of Appeals in Davis, in abandoning the presumption,
recognized that its decision was in accord with those of a majority of
states.37 Because of "rapid social and moral changes in our society," the act
of adultery alone is no longer a "highly persuasive indicium" of unfitness. 38
The court held that "whereas the fact of adultery may be a relevant
consideration in child custody awards, no presumption of unfitness on the
part of the adulterous parent arises from it; rather it should be weighed,
along with all other pertinent factors, only insofar as it affects the child's
welfare." 39 Thus, Davis represents a step towards a case by case determina-
tion of the welfare of the child, unencumbered by reliance on a presumption.
The inherent defect in the presumption was its tendency to discourage a full
examination of the facts and circumstances of each case to reach a just
award of custody. 40 Davis implicitly recognizes that "a person may be a bad
spouse or citizen without necessarily being a bad parent."'41
37. See 280 Md. at 127-28, 372 A.2d at 235.
38. Id. at 127, 372 A.2d at 235. Judge Digges cited the dissenting opinion of Judge
Hammond in Hild for support. Judge Hammond, perhaps already aware of the "rapid
social and moral changes" mentioned by the court seventeen years later, stated that:
[t]he days of the rule of public and private vengeance, when an adulteress was
stoned or made to wear the scarlet letter A in the pillory, have passed. It has
even progressed, I believe, since the time when this Court engaged in solemn
and serious discussion as to whether a mother who had committed adultery
should be permitted even to see her children. Hill v. Hill, 49 Md. 450;
Kremelberg v. Kremelberg, 52 Md. 553.
221 Md. at 363, 157 A.2d at 450.
Hild, Davis, and all other Maryland custody cases discussing the presumption
of unfitness from adultery involved an adulterous mother. In no case has the adultery
of a father been an issue. The only Maryland case indicating that the father might
have been an adulterer is Trudeau v. Trudeau, 204 Md. 214, 103 A.2d 563 (1954). The
court in Trudeau awarded custody to the mother over the father's claim that she was
unfit primarily because of her past adultery. Almost as an afterthought, the court
observed that "there is testimony in the record that would justify finding that the
breaking point of his [the father's] moral stability was at least as low as that he
claims of his former wife." Id. at 221, 103 A.2d at 566.
It is difficult to determine why custody cases in which the father was
potentially unfit because of his adultery never reached the Court of Appeals. That
such cases never arose in the lower courts seems highly unlikely. Arguably, the lower
courts applied a sex-based double standard, giving far less weight to a father's
adultery than to a mother's. Cf. Foster & Freed, supra note 29, at 431 (suggesting
double standard at appellate level). Such a view implicates Maryland's Equal Rights
Amendment, MD. CoNsT., Del. of Rts., art. 46 (enacted 1972). Maryland's "ERA"
provides: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of
sex." The effects of the ERA on custody law are discussed at notes 86 to 103 and
accompanying text infra.
39. 280 Md. at 127, 372 A.2d at 235. The Court of Special Appeals recently applied
the Davis holding with respect to the adultery presumption in Draper v. Draper, No.
472, slip op. (Md. Ct. Sp. App., filed March 9, 1978).
40. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
41. Podell, Peck & First, supra note 36, at 66.
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Although the primacy of the child's welfare is no longer questioned in
Maryland or other states,42 the factors a court should consider to determine
which potential custodian is better able to promote the child's best interests
is a difficult question. Generally, the factors discussed by courts affect a
child's physical, intellectual, psychological, and moral well-being. Thus, the
early common law rule that a father is entitled to the custody of his children
is no longer considered, 43 and acts of adultery, while relevant, do not render
a party presumptively unfit.44 Some general areas for consideration were
listed by the Court of Appeals in Hild v. Hild:45
the fitness of the persons seeking custody, the adaptability of the
prospective custodian to the task, the age, sex and health of the child,
the physical, spiritual and moral well-being of the child, the environ-
ment and surroundings in which the child will be reared, the influences
likely to be exerted on the child, and, if he or she is old enough to make a
rational choice, the preference of the child.46
Many commentators have formulated similar lists of considerations. 47
Increasingly, the formulations stress the psychological needs of the child.
One writer, for example, suggests that courts consider the following: (1)
school needs, (2) material needs, (3) need for adequate social stimulation, (4)
possible need for special therapy, (5) the quantity and quality of "parent-
ing," (6) the child's psychic status (individual psychological needs), (7) need
for adult models, and (8) need for stability.48 Section 402 of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act suggests the following guidelines for arriving at
the best interests of the child:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best
interest of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors
including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
42. See Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 174-75, 372 A.2d 582, 585-86 (1977); W.
NELSON, supra note 2, at §§ 15.01 & .02.
43. See note 2 supra.
44. See notes 33 to 41 and accompanying text supra.
45. 221 Md. 349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960).
46. Id. at 357, 157 A.2d at 446.
47. See 5 A. FREUD, THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD 455 (1969); W. NELSON, supra
note 2, at §§ 15.01-.21; Brosky & Alford, supra note 2, at 686-91; Foster & Freed, supra
note 35, at 438-43; Katz, Foster Parents Versus Agencies: A Case Study in the
Judicial Application of "The Best Interests of the Child" Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV.
145, 170 (1966); Oster, Custody Proceeding: A Study of Vague and Indefinite
Standards, 5 J. FAM. L. 21, 25-38 (1965); Note, Child Custody: Preference to the
Mother, 34 LA. L. REV. 881, 886-87 (1974). See generally, Shepherd, supra note 2, at
171-76.
48. Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following
Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 55, 67-72 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Watson].
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(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect
the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that
does not affect his relationship to the child.49
In abandoning the presumption of unfitness arising from adultery, the
Davis court adopted an approach similar to that of the last sentence of
section 402. The court indicated that adultery and all other pertinent factors
should be considered only insofar as they affect the child's welfare.50 Indeed,
if the best interest of the child is the guiding principle in custody cases, a
court cannot justify inquiring into matters that have no bearing on the
child's welfare.51
Most of the factors the Court of Appeals has considered in custody cases
do have a direct bearing on the best interests of the child.5 2 For example, the
court has often recognized that the child's preference as to his custodian is
important to a just decision.53 In Ross v. Pick,54 the court noted:
[I]n determining in a contest for custody what will promote the best
interests of the child, the child's own wishes may be consulted and given
49. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 402.
50. 280 Md. at 127, 372 A.2d at 235.
51. For an interesting criticism of the judicial consideration of such matters as
the potential custodian's religion or lack of religion, his or her sexual habits and
preferences, and his or her "lifestyle," see Child Custody, supra note 4, at 737-48. The
writer argues that such matters are ordinarily constitutionally protected from state
interference and thus should not be considered by courts in custody disputes since to
do so violates the potential custodian's rights. Id.
A court should, of course, respect the potential custodian's rights in these
areas and should not find a potential custodian unfit simply because his or her
conduct varies from the norm. However, it is the physical, intellectual, psychological,
and moral well-being of the child that is at stake in a custody dispute - not the
parents' constitutional rights. The parents' constitutional rights may be outweighed
by the state's compelling interest in protecting the welfare of the child.
52. See notes 131, 143 to 145, and accompanying text infra for a discussion of
judicial consideration of the wishes of the biological parents in cases involving third
parties. In such cases the welfare of the child is not necessarily served by judicial
preference for a parent over a third party.
53. See Franklin v. Franklin, 257 Md. 678, 683, 264 A.2d 829, 831 (1970)
(preference of 12-year-old considered); Holcomb v. Holcomb, 255 Md. 86, 88, 256 A.2d
886, 887 (1969) (per curiam) (preference of 11-year-old considered); Wallis v. Wallis, 235
Md. 33, 37, 200 A.2d 164, 166 (1964) (preferences of 9-year-old and 3-year-old not given
weight because of coaching); Wood v. Wood, 227 Md. 112, 115, 175 A.2d 573, 575 (1961)
(12-year-old mature enough to have wishes considered); Parker v. Parker, 222 Md. 69,
75, 158 A.2d 607, 609 (1960) (8-year-old too young and immature to have preferences
considered); Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 359, 157 A.2d 442, 447 (1960) (7-year-old too
young to have preferences considered); Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 422-23, 140
A.2d 660, 662 (1958) (preference of 10-year-old entitled to consideration); Wilhelm v.
Wilhelm, 214 Md. 80, 84-85, 133 A.2d 423, 425-26 (1957) (preference of 9-year-old
should be ascertained).
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weight if he is of sufficient age and capacity to form a rational
judgment.... [T]here is no specific age of a child at which his wishes
should be consulted and given weight by the court. The matter depends
upon the extent of the child's mental development .... It is not the
whim of the child that the court respects, but its feelings, attachments,
reasonable preference and probable contentment.55
The court has also stressed the desirability of keeping siblings together. 56 If
two or more siblings are the objects of a custody dispute, courts prefer to
award custody of all the children to one party on the theory that they should
have each other's companionship and that raising siblings in potentially
"hostile camps" would be harmful.57 The physical conditions and environ-
ment that a custodian can furnish are important, 58 but mere ability to
furnish a higher standard of living will not be considered.5 9 The Court of
Appeals has also emphasized the importance of whether a potential
custodian will be able to spend enough time with the child to give proper
guidance;6° the court has noted, however, that the fact that a mother is
employed will not be a controlling factor in a custody case.6 1 The court has
also considered whether a child will receive religious training with a
particular custodian6 2 and, if so, whether the training is in the same religion
as that of other members of the child's family.6 3 Another consideration has
been whether the child will be removed from the court's jurisdiction.6 4
54. 199 Md. 341, 86 A.2d 463 (1952).
55. Id. at 353, 86 A.2d at 469.
56. See Burns v. Bines, 189 Md. 157, 165, 55 A.2d 487, 490-91 (1947); Kartman v.
Kartman, 163 Md. 19, 26, 161 A. 269, 271 (1932). The judicial preference for keeping
siblings together was outweighed by other factors in Daubert v. Daubert, 239 Md. 303,
309, 211 A.2d 323, 326-27 (1965); Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 359, 157 A.2d 442, 447
(1960); Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 190, 148 A.2d 387, 390 (1959).
57. Roussey v. Roussey, 210 Md. 261, 264, 123 A.2d 354, 355-56 (1956).
58. See Cornwell v. Cornwell, 244 Md. 674, 678, 224 A.2d 870, 872 (1966); Daubert
v. Daubert, 239 Md. 303, 309, 211 A.2d 323, 327 (1965); Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md.
184, 189, 148 A.2d 387, 390 (1959).
59. See Montgomery County Dep't of Social Serv. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406,
423-24, 381 A.2d 1154, 1165 (1978) (case involving parent and third party); cf. Bray v.
Bray, 225 Md. 476, 484, 171 A.2d 500, 504-05 (1961) (mother's ability to provide
slightly larger house than father deemed inconsequential). Logically, a custodian
should be able to furnish some minimal facilities.
60. See DeGrange v. Kline, 254 Md. 240, 243, 254 A.2d 353, 355 (1969); Daubert v.
Daubert, 239 Md. 303, 307, 211 A.2d 323, 325-26 (1965); Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md.
103, 115-16, 43 A.2d 186, 191 (1945).
61. Roussey v. Roussey, 210 Md. 261, 264, 123 A.2d 354, 356 (1956).
62. Holcomb v. Holcomb, 255 Md. 86, 89, 256 A.2d 886, 888 (1969) (per curiam);
Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 187, 148 A.2d 387, 388-89 (1959). For a critical view
of judicial consideration of the religious practices of parties in custody cases, see Child
Custody, supra note 4, at 737-39.
63. Daubert v. Daubert, 239 Md. 303, 309-10, 211 A.2d 323, 327 (1965).
64. Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116, 43 A.2d 186, 191 (1945). For criticism
of judicial consideration of this factor on the ground that such consideration impedes
a person's right to travel from one state to another, see Child Custody, supra note 4, at
746.
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In addition to the presumption of unfitness arising from adultery, one of
the most frequently mentioned presumptions in recent Maryland custody
cases is the "tender years presumption" or "maternal preference" doctrine.
Essentially, the doctrine favors the mother over the father when the
children, especially girls, are of "tender years. '6 5 The Court of Appeals has
explained the doctrine: "[s]ince the mother is the natural custodian of the
young and immature, custody is ordinarily awarded to her at least
temporarily, in legal contests between parents when other things are equal
... provided the mother is a fit and proper person to have custody.166 The
evolution of the presumption in Maryland is interesting in light of the
history of the patria potestas doctrine and a statute negating any superior
right of custody between parents.67 Although as late as 1946 the Court of
Appeals spoke of the father's "natural right" to the custody of his children,
68
within the next two years the court recognized the maternal preference
doctrine.69 The court never offered any reasoned explanation for its change
in approach, even though some attempt would have seemed obligatory
considering the significance of the change. Moreover, the court did not
attempt to reconcile the tender years presumption with the express language
of article 72A, section 1 that "neither parent has any right superior to the
right of the other concerning the child's custody."70 The court's failure in
65. See Ouellette v. Ouellette, 246 Md. 604, 608, 229 A.2d 129, 131 (1967); Cornwell
v. Cornwell, 244 Md. 674, 678-79, 224 A.2d 870, 873 (1966). What constitutes "tender
years" is not completely clear. One supporter of the doctrine suggests that girls of any
age and boys under seven years old are better off with their mothers while boys over
seven generally are better off with their fathers. Bradbrook, The Relevance of
Psychological and Psychiatric Studies to the Future Development of the Laws
Governing the Settlement of Inter-Parental Child Custody Disputes, 11 J. FAM. L. 557,
586 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bradbrook]. Another doctor has recommended a
presumption that girls of any age should be with their mothers as should boys under
ten. He suggests that most boys over fifteen should be placed with their fathers.
Watson, supra note 48, at 82. A third writer merely advises that a child between three
and six have both male and female parent figures in his or her environment, and that
during adolescence, the parent of the same sex as the child is likely to be more capable
of wielding constructive control over the child than is the parent of the opposite sex.
ABA SECTION OF FAMILY LAW PROCEEDINGS 42-43 (1963) (remarks of Dr. Herbert
Modlin) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]. The differing psychological theories
advanced by the respective writers indicate the difficulty a judge faces when deciding
how much consideration to give to the age and sex of a child as factors affecting the
custody issue.
66. Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 357, 157 A.2d 442, 446 (1960).
67. See note 2 supra.
68. Sibley v. Sibley, 187 Md. 358, 362, 50 A.2d 128, 130 (1946).
69. See Miller v. Miller, 191 Md. 396, 408, 62 A.2d 293, 298-99 (1948); accord,
Cullotta v. Cullotta, 193 Md. 374, 384, 66 A.2d 919, 924 (1949).
70. MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (Cum. Supp. 1929). See note 2 supra. The current
version of article 72A, § 1 varies somewhat from the original:
The father and mother are the joint natural guardians of their child under
eighteen years of age and are jointly and severally charged with its support,
care, nurture, welfare and education. They shall. have equal powers and
duties, and neither parent has any right superior to the right of the other
concerning the child's custody .... Where the parents live apart, the court
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this regard is especially surprising since it had only recently implicitly
recognized that the paternal preference doctrine was incompatible with the
same section. 7
1
The Court of Appeals' approach to the presumption is unclear. The court
has indicated that the presumption applies only as a "tie-breaker" when all
other considerations are equal. 72 Yet, the court has also indicated that a
mother is the preferred custodian of children of tender years provided she is
not unfit,73 and a mother and her children should not be separated without
"grave and weighty reasons. ' 74 Under the second approach, motherhood is a
material factor in ascertaining the welfare of the child. Resolution of the
inconsistency between the two standards awaits a Court of Appeals
decision.
Whether treated as a "tie-breaker" or a material factor, prior to Davis,
the tender years presumption was frequently of no aid to an adulterous
mother. 75 In light of Davis and the demise of the presumption of unfitness
arising from adultery, the maternal preference doctrine now may result in a
may award the guardianship of the child to either of them, but, in any custody
proceeding, neither parent shall be given preference solely because of his or
her sex.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
71. See Dunnigan v. Dunnigan, 182 Md. 47, 52, 31 A.2d 634, 636 (1943).
72. See, e.g., Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md. 327, 331, 207 A.2d 481, 483 (1965); Hild v.
Hild, 221 Md. 349, 357, 157 A.2d 442, 446 (1960). Though not used by the Court of
Appeals, the term "tie-breaker" was used by the Court of Special Appeals in Cooke v.
Cooke, 21 Md. App. 376, 380, 319 A.2d 841, 843 (1974).
73. See Oberlander v. Oberlander, 256 Md. 672, 676, 261 A.2d 727, 729 (1970)
("general rule [is] that the custody of a child of tender years should ordinarily be
awarded to the mother"); Roussey v. Roussey, 210 Md. 261, 264, 123 A.2d 354, 355
(1956) ("[u]nless the mother is an unfit person, she is usually preferred where the
children are of tender years").
74. Cullotta v. Cullotta, 193 Md. 374, 384, 66 A.2d 919, 924 (1949). The tender years
presumption was cited as a significant consideration when the mother was awarded
custody in Neuwiller v. Neuwiller, 257 Md. 285, 286-87, 262 A.2d 736, 737 (1970);
Kauten v. Kauten, 257 Md. 10, 11, 261 A.2d 759, 760 (1970); Ouellette v. Ouellette, 246
Md. 604, 608, 229 A.2d 129, 131 (1967); Cornwell v. Cornwell, 244 Md. 674, 678-79, 224
A.2d 870, 873 (1966); Oliver v. Oliver, 217 Md. 222, 228, 140 A.2d 908, 911 (1958);
Roussey v. Roussey, 210 Md. 261, 264, 123 A.2d 354, 355 (1956).
75. When applied as a material factor, the presumption was overcome by the
mother's adultery in, e.g., Pontorno v. Pontorno, 257 Md. 576, 581, 263 A.2d 820, 822
(1970); Winter v. Crowley, 231 Md. 323, 330-31, 190 A.2d 87, 91 (1963) (presumption
overcome in part by adultery); Parker v. Parker, 222 Md. 69, 75-76, 158 A.2d 607, 610
(1960). When treated as a "tie-breaker," a mother's adultery prevented the use of the
doctrine. See, e.g., Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md. 327, 331-32, 207 A.2d 481, 483-84 (1965);
Wallis v. Wallis, 235 Md. 33, 38, 200 A.2d 164, 165-66 (1964); Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349,
357-58, 157 A.2d 442, 446-47 (1960).
Other factors have also overcome the presumption. See, e.g., Daubert v.
Daubert, 239 Md. 303, 308-09, 211 A.2d 323, 326-27 (1965) (material factor; father had
more time and facilities); Winter v. Crowley, 231 Md. 323, 330-31, 190 A.2d 87, 91
(1963) (material factor; harm of changing custody); Sewell v. Sewell, 218 Md. 63,
71-73, 145 A.2d 422, 426-27 (1958) (material factor; child well adjusted in father's
home); Miller v. Miller, 191 Md. 396, 408, 62 A.2d 293, 299 (1948) (material factor;
mother too undependable).
652 [VOL. 37
CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES
greater number of custody awards to mothers. This will occur if the doctrine
is treated as a material element in every custody dispute involving young
children. If it is so treated, it is reasonable to assume that the greatly
decreased emphasis placed upon adultery will result in more mothers
benefiting from the tender years presumption. If, however, the presumption
is viewed as a "tie-breaker," its influence will be slight since it would be
utilized only when all other factors are equal - a rare situation.76
The fate of the maternal preference doctrine is more aptly discussed,
however, not in terms of its treatment as a material consideration or a "tie-
breaker," but in terms of whether it will survive at all. In McAndrew v.
McAndrew,77 the Court of Special Appeals held that application of the
tender years presumption was statutorily impermissible. 78 The chancellor
had found the parties equally fit and applied the presumption as a "tie-
breaker"; the Court of Special Appeals remanded the case for determination
of custody without use of the presumption. 79 The court concluded that the
1974 amendment to section 1 of article 72A abolished the presumption by
providing that "in any custody proceeding, neither parent shall be given
preference solely because of his or her sex."' 0 Noting that when the
amendment was enacted the maternal preference was the only doctrine in
custody proceedings favoring either spouse based on sex, the court reasoned
that the General Assembly's sole intention was to abolish the preference.8'
The court stated that absent such intention, the amendment was meaning-
less.8 2 By disposing of the case under section 1, the court concluded that it
need not decide whether the maternal preference violated Maryland's Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA).83
In abolishing the tender years presumption, the court in McAndrew
rejected the reasoning of Cooke v. Cooke.84 In Cooke, the Court of Special
76. In McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 9, 382 A.2d 1081, 1086 (1978), the
Court of Special Appeals stated that there should never be a tie.
77. 39 Md. App. 1, 382 A.2d 1081 (1978).
78. Id. at 8, 382 A.2d at 1085-86.
79. Id. at 9, 382 A.2d at 1086.
80. Id. at 8, 382 A.2d at 1086 (quoting ch. 181, 1974 Md. Laws). See note 70 supra.
81. One trial judge had so interpreted the amendment prior to McAndrew. See
Levin, Guardian Ad Litem in a Family Court, 34 MD. L. REv. 341, 354 n.73 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Levin]. The fact that the amendment was passed a relatively
short time (about one and one-half years) after adoption of the ERA may indicate that
the legislature intended to bring article 72A, § 1 into line with the ERA by eliminating
a major sex-based classification.
82. McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. at 8, 382 A.2d at 1086. The court stated
that its decision did not preclude a consideration of the "biological and psychological"
differences between the potential custodians; to the extent that such differences affect
the best interests of the child, they may be considered. Id. at 8, 382 A.2d at 1086. The
decision does mean that "[a] parent is no longer presumed to be clothed with or to lack
a particular attribute merely because that parent is male or female." Id. at 9, 382 A.2d
at 1086.
83. Id. at 8 n.9, 382 A.2d at 1086 n.9 The ERA is found in MD. CONST., Decl. of
Rts., art. 46 (enacted 1972).
84. McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. at 7-9,382 A.2d at 1085-86. The Cooke
case is found at 21 Md. App. 376, 319 A.2d 841 (1974).
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Appeals concluded that the presumption could be used as a "tie-breaker. '85
Unlike McAndrew, the Cooke court discussed the effect of the ERA on the
presumption, though neither party had raised the issue.8 6 Although at odds
with the widespread view of commentators that a state ERA precludes
application of the presumption, 87 the Cooke court, for two reasons, refused to
say that Maryland's ERA made the maternal preference doctrine unconsti-
tutional. First, the court noted that the concept that the "equality of creation
of all persons was not meant to describe human congenital endowments, but
rather their political and legal rights."8 8 The reference to "human congenital
endowments" may express the same idea as the Hild court's statement that
a mother is the "natural" custodian of the young.8 9 Thus, just as the ERA
cannot change the physiological differences between the sexes, Cooke
apparently argues that ERA cannot be read to regulate the basic natural
phenomenon of "motherhood." The court's second reason was that the
maternal preference doctrine is only a part of the larger determination of a
child's best interest; it is the interests of the child, not parental rights, that
are at issue in custody cases.90 The preference is to be used only in the
unusual case when "it would otherwise be impossible to decide upon the
evidentiary facts." 91
McAndrew properly rejected the Cooke reasoning. The Cooke court's
assumption that because of "congenital endowments" women are more
naturally suited to raising children than are men is no longer valid in
modem society. Because of the common occurrence of employed mothers and
the increasingly important role of women in all phases of business activity,
the stereotype of the mother as homemaker and child-raiser is no longer
viable. 92 Moreover, substantial recent research indicates that the "mother-
ing function" can be performed by either sex, because what a child needs is
the satisfaction of his physical and emotional needs - a function which
85. 21 Md. App. at 380, 319 A.2d at 843.
86. See id. at 379, 319 A.2d at 843.
87. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YA.E L.J. 871, 953 (1971);
Gabler, The Impact of the ERA on Domestic Relations Law: Specific Focus on
California, 8 FAM. L. Q. 51, 77-78 (1974); Levin, supra note 81, at 354-55 & n.73; 2 U.
BALT. L. REv. 355, 358 (1973). See generally Comment, The Effect of the Equal Rights
Amendment on Kentucky's Domestic Relations Law, 12 J. FAM. L. 151, 152-53
(1972-73). The Cooke court made no reference to the above commentaries.
88. 21 Md. App. at 379, 319 A.2d at 843 (footnote omitted).
89. 221 Md. at 357, 157 A.2d at 446.
90. 21 Md. App. at 379-80, 319 A.2d at 843.
91. Id. at 380, 319 A.2d at 844.
92. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 65, at 30 (remarks of Harry M. Fain); Note,
Child Custody: Preference to the Mother, 34 LA. L. REv. 881, 885-86 & n.22 (1974);
Comment, The Tender Years Presumption: Do the Children Bear the Burden?, 21 S.
DAK. L. REv. 332, 346 (1976).
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fathers can perform as well as mothers. 93 With respect to the Cooke court's
statement that the preference may be used as a "tie-breaker," it is illogical to
imply that consideration of sex becomes lawful when limited to cases where
both parties are equally fit. The ERA and section 1 of article 72A either
apply or do not apply to child custody cases, and, if they apply, they prohibit
consideration of sex in all cases. In criticizing the Cooke decision, one writer
has pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has explicitly rejected
the "tie-breaker concept. '94 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently held
that whether the presumption is applied as a "tie-breaker" or as a material
factor, the doctrine violates the Pennsylvania ERA's "concept of the
equality of the sexes."95 Moreover, as the McAndrew court noted:
There can be no tie-breaker in a custody case because, as we indicated in
Cooke, supra, there should never be a tie. The determination of custody
is an area in which discretion is vested in a judge and in which
appellate review of his exercise of that discretion is limited.... He has
at his command not only the evidence offered by the parties but a full
panoply of social service and other extrajudicial agency resources. From
all of that he is required to make a decision.96
93. Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L
423, 449-57 (1976-77). See R. SCHAFFER, MOTHERING (1977), in which the author
observes:
What we can say with confidence, though, is that it is these personality
attributes (whatever they may turn out to be) that are the essential adult
contribution to bonding - and not kinship. Mother need not be the biological
mother: it can be any person of either sex. The ability to rear a child, to love
and cherish and care for him, is basically a matter of personality: the so-
called blood bond is a complete myth. There is nothing to suggest that firm
attachments cannot grow between children and unrelated adults who take
over the parental role - by fostering or adoption, for instance. The notion
that the biological mother, by virtue of being the biological mother, is
uniquely capable of caring for her child is without foundation.
There is, for that matter, no reason why the mother role should not be
filled as competently by males as by females.
Id. at 103-04 (emphasis in original). Accord, PROCEEDINGS, supra note 65, at 41-43
(remarks of Dr. Herbert Modlin). See also PROCEEDINGS, supra note 65, at 30-31
(remarks of Harry M. Fain). But see Bradbrook, supra note 65, at 586; Watson, supra
note 48, at 82.
94. See Kurtz, The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on
Domestic Relations Law, 11 FAm. L. Q. 101, 141 (1977). Kurtz questioned the
constitutionality of Cooke on the basis of Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Idaho statute that preferred males over
equally qualified females seeking appointment as administrators of decedents'
estates.
95. Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 300, 368 A.2d 635,
639-40 (1977). But cf. Gordon v. Gordon, 46 U.S.L.W. 2436 (Okla. S. Ct. Feb. 7, 1978)
(equal protection not violated by state statute mandating tender years presumption);
J.B. v. A.B., 46 U.S.L.W. 2508 (W. Va. S. Ct. March 14, 1978) (tender years
presumption does not violate equal protection).
96. McAndrew -v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 9, 382 A.2d 1081, 1086 (1978).
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Compelling reasons exist for believing that the Maryland Court of
Appeals will agree with the McAndrew court and follow the lead of other
states that have abandoned the tender years presumption. 97 Either section 1
of article 72A, the ERA, or a combination of both provides a basis for
abandoning the presumption.
The Court of Appeals relied upon the combined effect of the ERA and
section 1 in the recent child support case of Rand v. Rand.98 In Rand, the
court held that the responsibility for child support should be allocated
according to each parent's financial resources and not the sex of the parent.
Pre-Rand cases applied the common law rule that a father is primarily liable
for the support of his minor children. 99 Such cases failed to consider the
section 1 provision that "[tihe father and mother . . . are jointly and
severally charged with [their child's] support .... They shall have equal
powers and duties . . . ."10 No case considered the effect of the statute on
the common law rule. In Rand, however, the Court emphatically indicated
that the ERA had altered the legal status of sex-based classifications:
[W]e believe that the "broad, sweeping, mandatory language" of the
amendment is cogent evidence that the people of Maryland are fully
committed to equal rights for men and women. The adoption of the
E.R.A. in this state was intended to, and did, drastically alter traditional
views of the validity of sex-based classifications.
Applying the mandate of the E.R.A. to the case before us, we hold
that the parental obligation for child support is not primarily an
obligation of the father but is one shared by both parents. The clear
import of the language of Art. 72A, § 1, standing alone, seemingly
97. The tender years presumption was abandoned on policy grounds in In re
Marriage of Bowen, 219 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Iowa 1974), and on statutory grounds in
Kockrow v. Kockrow, 191 Neb. 657, 662-63, 217 N.W.2d 89, 92 (1974). In Watts v.
Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fain. Ct. 1973), a New York family court
held that "application of the 'tender years presumption' would deprive [the father] of
his right to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution." Id. at 183, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 290. Although the opinion is
unclear, the tender years presumption may have been challenged on equal protection
grounds in Koger v. Koger, 217 Md. 372, 142 A.2d 599 (1958); the Court of Appeals
stated that "[aln award of custody to the mother, in a proper case, does not violate
any of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution." Id. at 376, 142 A.2d at 601. See Gordon v. Gordon, 46 U.S.L.W. 2436
(Okla. S. Ct. Feb. 17, 1978) (equal protection not violated by state statute mandating
tender years presumption). Even if Koger is viewed as an unsuccessful equal
protection attack on the presumption, the case would not bar an ERA-based
challenge.
98. 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977).
99. See, e.g., Seltzer v. Seltzer, 251 Md. 44, 45, 246 A.2d 264, 265 (1968); Wagshal v.
Wagshal, 249 Md. 143, 147, 238 A.2d 903, 906 (1968); Chalkley v. Chalkley, 240 Md.
743, 744, 215 A.2d 807, 808 (1966); Woodall v. Woodall, 16 Md. App. 17, 27, 293 A.2d
839, 844-45 (1972).
100. Md. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Ch. 678, 1951 Md. Laws
extended the duty "for support of a minor child to both parents." See notes 2 & 70 for
original and present versions, respectively, of § 1.
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compels that result. Any doubt remaining from the past failure of the
courts to so interpret that statutory provision is removed by the gloss
impressed upon it by the E.R.A. The common law rule is a vestige of the
past; it cannot be reconciled with our commitment to equality of the
sexes.... Child support awards must be made on a sexless basis.101
Rand's discussion of the impact of the ERA and section 1 of article 72A
of Maryland child support cases indicates how the court would view a
challenge to the tender years presumption based upon the ERA and section
1. As in the case of child support, section 1 seemingly requires that no
distinctions be drawn in child custody cases on the basis of sex.10 2 If, as
Rand says, the ERA has impressed a "gloss" on that section, and removed
all remaining doubt about its literal meaning, the Court of Appeals can no
longer justify the retention of the tender years presumption. If the ERA and
section 1 compel equal treatment of the sexes in child support matters, the
same equal treatment should result in custody cases. The statutory language
is unambiguous: "neither parent has any right superior to the right of the
other concerning the child's custody .... [I]n any custody proceeding,
neither parent shall be given preference solely because of his or her sex."' 10 3
CUSTODY DISPUTES BETWEEN PARENTS AND THIRD PARTIES
In addition to the presumption of unfitness arising from adultery and
the tender years presumption, a frequently stated maxim in child custody
cases is that a parent normally has a right to the custody of his or her child
superior to that of all other persons. Custody of one's child is viewed as a
natural right incident to parenthood. This right is so important that custody
will be granted to a third person only if both parents are unfit or there are
other factors that substantially affect the best interests of the child. 04 The
Maryland Court of Appeals recently dealt with the problem of third party-
parent custody disputes in Ross v. Hoffman.0 5 In Ross, the Court of Appeals
stated that there is a rebuttable presumption that the child's best interests
are served by granting custody to a biological parent rather than a third
party.06 The court indicated the presumption in favor of the biological
101. 280 Md. at 515-16, 374 A.2d at 904-05.
102. See note 70 supra.
103. MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Even before the 1974
amendment to § 1, use of the tender years presumption by Maryland courts is difficult
to rationalize in view of the statute's clear language that "neither parent has any
right superior to the right of the other concerning the child's custody .... See
McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 5 n.7, 382 A.2d 1081, 1084 n.7 (1978).
104. See W. NELSON, supra note 2, at § 15.15.
105. 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977).
106. Id. at 178-79, 372 A.2d at 587. Although not specifically relied upon, there is
statutory authority for the presumption and the standard for its rebuttal. The statute
states:
The provisions of this article shall not be deemed to affect the existing law
relative to the appointment of a third person as guardian of the person of the
minor where the parents are unsuitable, or the child's interests would be
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parent is overcome by a showing that: "(a) the parent is unfit to have
custody, or (b) ...there are such exceptional circumstances as make such
custody detrimental to the best interest of the child."107
The parent in Ross had an all-night job. Therefore, a babysitter, Mrs.
Hoffman, was hired to care for Melinda, Mrs. Ross' three and one-half
month old daughter. After a few weeks of picking the child up in the
morning and leaving her at the Hoffmans' late at night, Mrs. Ross found
herself unable to take proper care of her daughter and get adequate rest
during the days. As a result, she decided to let the child stay with the
Hoffmans throughout the work week. After approximately one month, Mrs.
Ross stopped keeping her daughter on weekends and days off; instead, her
daughter lived with the Hoffmans on a full-time basis. Melinda remained
with the Hoffmans for the next eight and one-half years, and Mrs. Ross'
visits and financial support for the child were irregular. Even though her
work shifts changed and apparently would have permitted her to spend
more time with the child, the mother sometimes failed to visit her daughter
for two or three months. The most she contributed towards Melinda's
support in any one year was $540, but in at least one year, she contributed
nothing. After eight and one-half years, Mrs. Ross married, procured steady
employment, and reclaimed her daughter.108
In granting custody of Melinda to the Hoffmans, 10 9 the chancellor relied
heavily upon the testimony of a doctor who had examined Melinda. The
doctor noted the substantial emotional stress and confusion Melinda had
experienced as a result of the dispute over her custody. The judge also
indicated his approval of the concept of "psychological parenthood" and its
applicability to the case.110 Both the Court of Special Appeals and the Court
adversely affected by remaining under the natural guardianship of its parent
or parents.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
107. 280 Md. at 178-79, 372 A.2d at 587. The rationale for the presumption is:
Normally a parent is to be preferred to others in determining custody,
largely because the affection of a parent for a child is as strong and potent as
any that springs from human relations and leads to desire and efforts to care
properly for and raise the child, which are greater than another would be
likely to display.
Id. at 178 n.4, 372 A.2d at 587 n.4 (quoting Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 188, 148
A.2d 387, 389 (1959)).
108. 280 Md. at 181-82, 372 A.2d at 588-89.
109. The trial judge stated that Mrs. Ross' only real argument for custody was her
biological motherhood. The chancellor concluded that rather than risk placing her in
a new environment, the stability of which was uncertain, it was better to keep the
child in the loving atmosphere where she concededly performed well. Ross v.
Hoffman, 33 Md. App. 333, 342-43, 364 A.2d 596, 602 (1976).
110. Id. at 36-37, 364 A.2d at 599. The term "psychological parent" is used in
GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973)
[hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SotNIT]. The authors describe the concept
as follows:
[Diecisionmakers in law have recognized the necessity of protecting a child's
physical well-being as a guide to placement. But they have been slow to
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of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.' The Court of Appeals
concluded that the Hoffmans had overcome the presumption in favor of the
biological parents by showing that "exceptional circumstances" existed
which made custody with the biological mother "detrimental to the best
interest of the child." The mother and child were separated for eight and
one-half years; the child was strongly attached to the custodian and
exhibited substantial emotional turmoil at the prospect of being separated
from her; the stability of the mother's new marriage was uncertain; and the
mother's motives and desire for custody were not sufficiently clear.112
Given the great number of "exceptional circumstances" present in the
Ross case, the court's decision in favor of the third party is not surprising.
Because of the psychological parenthood doctrine with its rejection of any
presumption in favor of biological parents, however, Ross and similar cases
understand and to acknowledge the necessity of safeguarding a child's
psychological well-being. While they make the interests of the child
paramount over all other claims when his physical well-being is in jeopardy,
they subordinate, often unintentionally, his psychological well-being to, for
example, an adult's right to assert a biological tie. Yet both well-beings are
equally important, and any sharp distinction between them is artifical.
[F]or the child, the physical realities of his conception and birth are not the
direct cause of his emotional attachment. This attachment results from day-
to-day attention to his needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort,
affection, and stimulation. Only a parent who provides for these needs will
build a psychological relationship to the child on the basis of the biological
one and will become his "psychological parent" in whose care the child can
feel valued and "wanted."
The [psychological parent] role can be fulfilled either by a biological parent or
by an adoptive parent or by any other caring adult - but never by an absent,
inactive adult, whatever his biological or legal relationship to the child may
be.
Id. at 4, 17, 19. The authors also emphasize the importance of judicial consideration of
a child's need for "continuity of relationships, surroundings, and environmental
influence" in order to maximize his normal development. Id. at 31-32. Also, a child's
"sense of time" is described as different from that of adults: the younger a child is,
the more sensitive he is to periods of separation from a parent or other adult for whom
he has developed an attachment:
The younger the child, the shorter is the interval before a leave-taking will be
experienced as a permanent loss accompanied by feelings of helplessness and
profound deprivation. Since a child's sense of time is directly related to his
capacity to cope with breaches in continuity, it becomes a factor in
determinating if, when, and with what urgency the law should act.
Id. at 42.
111. The Court of Appeals, relying upon Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 372 A.2d 231
(1977),. emphasized that its affirmance on the issue of custody was based on its
conclusion that the trial judge had not clearly abused his discretion; it stated the
Court of Special Appeals had applied an incorrect standard of review when it affirmed
on the basis of its own "best judgment." 280 Md. at 185-87, 372 A.2d at 590-91. For a
discussion of the standard of appellate review in custody cases, see notes 15 to 31 and
accompanying text supra.
112. 280 Md. at 192, 372 A.2d at 594.
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in other states raise important issues.113 The approval of the Court of
Appeals in Ross of the trial court's reliance on the psychological parenthood
doctrine casts considerable doubt on the present status of the biological
parent presumption. However, constitutional limitations on abandoning or
significantly weakening the presumption may exist. Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that parents have an interest in the
custody of their children. In Stanley v. Illinois,114 the Court held that a state
may not deprive a father of the custody of his illegitimate child without a
hearing on his fitness as a parent. Noting that the father's due process
challenge required weighing the governmental and private interests at
stake, the Court emphasized:
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and
raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful counter-
vailing interest, protection. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children
"come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when
appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic
arrangements."
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family.
The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed
"essential," . . . "basic civil rights of man," . . . and "[rnights far more
precious . . .than property rights ....
113. The judicial preference for the biological parents and the influential and
controversial "psychological parenthood" concept found in GOLDSTEIN, FREUD &
SoLNrT, supra note 110, along with the earlier "psychological best interests" concept
suggested in Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes
Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L. J. 151 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Alternatives],
have frequently clashed in recent child custody cases. Compare Powers v. Hadden, 30
Md. App. 577, 589-93, 353 A.2d 641, 648-50 (1976) (Davidson, J., dissenting) (urging
acceptance of psychological parent concept) and New Jersey Div. of Youth and
Family Serv. v. Huggins, 148 N.J. Super 86, 93-94, 371 A.2d 841, 845-46 (1977)
(accepting psychological parenthood concept) and Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543,
553, 356 N.E.2d 277, 286, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 829 (1976) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring)
(accepting psychological parenthood concept) with Montgomery County Dep't of
Social Serv. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 381 A.2d 1154 (1978) (rejecting the
psychological parenthood concept as the sole consideration in custody disputes) and
In re J. & J.W., 134 Vt. 480, 483-84, 365 A.2d 521, 523-24 (1976) (psychological
parenthood concept standing alone not enough to negate biological parents' rights).
For critiques of the theory espoused by GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNrr, see generally
Hammell, Littner, Nichtern & Polier, Book Review, 53 CHILD WELFARE 189 (1974);
Read, Book Review, 13 J. FAM. L. 601 (1973-74); Schuman, Book Review, 8 FAM. L.Q.
343 (1974); Strauss & Strauss, Book Review, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 996 (1974).
114. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
115. Id. at 651. The Illinois statute held unconstitutional in Stanley allowed an
unwed father to be deprived of the custody of his illegitimate children without a
hearing on his fitness as a parent. In fact, an unwed father was not included in the
statutory definition of "parent."
[VOL. 37
CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES
The Court concluded that, absent a showing of unfitness, the state's interest
in interfering with a parent's right to custody is de minimis. 11 6
Permitting the state to remove a child from the custody of his or her
parents without a finding of unfitness would go far, as one student observer
has noted, toward realizing the fear of many people that government has
become too powerful in controlling the private lives of its citizens. 117 As
evidenced by Stanley, such a system would likely violate due process. It is
fundamental in our society that people have a right to conceive and raise a
family and that parents have a right to the custody of their children. 118 If
parental interests were completely subjugated to the welfare of the child, as
determined by the state, nothing logically would prevent the state from
deciding at a child's birth whether the parents or some other person could
best promote the child's welfare.
However, when the biological parents relinquish custody of their child to
another person for a substantial period of time, the state's interest in the
welfare of the child may override the rights of the parents; indeed, there may
be a waiver by the parents of their rights. The longer the child is in the
custody of persons other than parents, the greater the likelihood that both
the child and the custodian will come to view their relationship as familial;
both the child and the third party will consequently feel a substantial loss if
their relationship is terminated. 119 More importantly, the child may sustain
long-lasting emotional damage. 120 Even if a parent relinquishes custody for
sound reasons and later seeks to regain custody, the sense of loss and
confusion felt by the young child is keen, irrespective of the reason for the
separation.12
116. The Court stated that:
The State's interest in caring for Stanley's children is de minimis if Stanley is
shown to be a fit father. It insists on presuming rather than proving Stanley's
unfitness solely because it is more convenient to presume than to prove.
Under the Due Process Clause that advantage is insufficient to justify
refusing a father a hearing when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of
his family.
Id. at 657-58.
117. See Comment, Proceedings to Terminate Parental Rights: Too Much or Too
Little Protection for Parents?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 337, 342-47 (1976).
118. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
119. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SoLNIT, supra note 110, at 80.
120. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 191, 372 A.2d 582, 593-94 (1977).
121. The effects on a young child of separation from a parent-figure have been the
subject of many studies. See, e.g., 2 J. BowLBY, ATrACHMENT AND Loss (1973);
LITTNER, SOME TRAUMATIC EFFECTS OF SEPARATION AND PLACEMENT 7, 13, 20-24
(1956). Anna Freud suggests that such separations affect the child regardless of their
causes. Because the infant cannot grasp the reasons for the parent's disappearance,
every separation constitutes a desertion for him. Before his sense of time develops, the
pressure of his needs makes every waiting period seem agonizingly long; therefore, he
does not distinguish between separations of short and long duration. Freud argues
that because the young child views separations from his parent as rejections, a
variety of emotional responses, from incessant crying to silent despair, may occur. A
child has a need for a parent-figure; he may, upon separation, withdraw his feelings
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A striking example of the problems faced in balancing the psychological
and emotional welfare of the child against the desires of parents to regain
custody is found in the predicament of the Jewish parents of Holland who
returned from concentration camps at the end of World War II and sought to
reclaim their children who had been entrusted to non-Jewish families.
Many of these children had become totally estranged from their
biological parents and had grown intimately into the families of their
foster parents. The choice in such tragic instances is between causing
intolerable hardship to the child who is torn away from his psychologi-
cal parents, or causing further intolerable hardship to already
victimized adults who, after losing freedom, livelihood, and worldly
possessions . . . now [face] los[ing] possession of their child. 122
Rather than leave this crisis to a case-by-case resolution, the Dutch
legislature decreed that all the children would be returned to their biological
parents. 123 In spite of emotion-filled cases like that of the Dutch Jews,
several writers have argued the most appropriate way to deal with such
problems is to eliminate the presumption in favor of biological parents and
refocus attention on the welfare of the child. 124 The rationale for eliminating
the presumption is that no basis exists for presuming that the best interests
of the child will be served by precipitously removing him from the security
and warmth he has known in a third party's home and returning him to a
biological parent. On the contrary, it may be adverse to the child's
psychological, developmental, and physical interests. 25
from the parent and search for a substitute. This need of the young child to form new
ties obscures the seriousness of what occurs. The child's next attempt at "object-love"
will not be of quite the same quality and will be more demanding for immediate wish-
fulfillment. Repeated "rejection by separation," suggests Freud, intensifies the process
of deterioration and produces individuals who are dissatisfied, shallow, and
promiscuous in their relationships. A. FREUD, SAFEGUARDING THE EMOTIONAL
HEALTH OF OUR CHILDREN 11, 12 (1955).
122. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNiT, supra note 110, at 107.
123. Id. at 107-08.
124. See, eg., GOLDSTEIN, FREUD, & SoLNrr, supra note 110, at 98; PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 65, at 31-34 (remarks of Harry M. Fain); Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights
for Children, 6 FAm. L.Q. 343, 350 (1972); Foster & Freed, supra note 35, at 436-37;
Alternatives, supra note 113, at 157-58.
125. Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 350 (1972). In
Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (Cum. Supp. 1977) would appear to prevent
elimination of the presumption in third party-parent custody cases. Without the
statute, however, a recent Supreme Court case, Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), provides some basis for arguing that elimination of the
parental presumption would not violate parents' due process liberty interests. This
basis exists even though the Court has recognized the importance of the family
relationship, see, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S, 816, 842-47
(1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,651 (1972); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533
(1953); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and even though the New York
Court of Appeals has stated that under Stanley, courts are powerless to deny custody
to a parent except "for grievous cause or necessity." Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d
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The Maryland Court of Appeals has steadily relied upon the presump-
tion favoring biological parents.126 As stated by the Ross court, a parent is
entitled to custody unless he or she is unfit or unless "exceptional
circumstances" exist.127 Ross listed seven factors to be evaluated in
determining whether exceptional circumstances exist: the length of the
child's separation from the biological parent, the age of the child when the
third party assumed care, the possible emotional effect on the child of a
custody change, 128 the amount of time elapsed before the parent sought to
regain custody, the nature and strength of the ties between the child and
third party, the intensity and genuineness of the parent's desire to have the
child, and the stability and certainty of the child's future with the parent. 129
543, 545-46, 356 N.E.2d 277, 291, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824 (1976). Smith involved a suit
by foster parents against state and city officials. The foster parents alleged that the
statutory and regulatory procedures for removal of foster children from foster homes
violated the due process and equal protection clauses. The Court held that even if the
foster parents had a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the state procedures
did not violate such interest. Id. at 847. The Court implied that any constitutionally
protected interest that existed was very weak. First, the biological parents had
voluntarily placed their children with the state agency which, in turn, had transferred
custody temporarily to the foster parents. Under state law, the parents retained the
near-absolute right to the return of their children, and they had relinquished custody
with this understanding. Moreover, each foster family had signed a contract with the
state agency recognizing the rights of the biological parents. The Court stressed,
however, that a biological relationship is not determinative of the existence of a
family and that a deeply caring and interdependent relationship may exist between
an adult and an unrelated child in his or her care. Thus, a foster family cannot be
dismissed as "a mere collection of unrelated individuals." Id. at 844-45. The Court left
open the possibility that a third party might acquire a substantive liberty interest in
the custody of another's child, particularly where the contractual and state
involvement aspects of Smith did not exist. Thus, the Bennett interpretation of the
biological parent's constitutionally protected status may be too expansive. If the
Supreme Court eventually recognizes a third party's interest, such action could have
the effect of severely limiting any constitutionally mandated parental presumption.
The result would be no presumption in favor of either party.
126. See, eg., DeGrange v. Kline, 254 Md. 240, 242-43, 254 A.2d 353, 354 (1969);
McClary v. Follett, 226 Md. 436, 441-42, 174 A.2d 66, 69 (1961); Melton v. Connolly,
219 Md. 184, 188, 148 A.2d 387, 389 (1959); Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 420, 140
A.2d 660, 661 (1958); Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952); Piotrowski
v. State, 179 Md. 377, 381-82, 18 A.2d 199, 200-01 (1941); Kartman v. Kartman, 163
Md. 19, 23, 161 A. 269, 270 (1932).
127. 280 Md. 172, 178-79, 372 A.2d 582, 587 (1977).
128. Maryland cases, e.g., Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 188-89, 148 A.2d 387,
389-90 (1959), indicate, as does psychological literature, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, FREUD &
SoLNIr, supra note 110, at 17-19, that if a child has become so attached to a third
person through a long period of living with him or her, separating the child from the
third party should be avoided because of the danger of emotional harm to the child.
See notes 110 & 121 supra. The third party and child need not have lived together for
any specific period, provided the time is sufficient in the particular case for "ties of
blood [to] weaken, and ties of companionship [to] strengthen... ." Chapsky v. Wood,
26 Kan. 650, 653, 40 Am. Rep. 321, 323 (1881). The Court of Special Appeals recently
stated that no specific period can be prescribed for determining how long a child must
live with a person in order for the person to become a psychological parent. See
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Two of the seven factors - the lapse of time before the parent seeks to
regain custody and the intensity and genuineness of the parent's desire to
have the child - are factors that have little effect on the child's
psychological state.13
The other five factors reflect the court's usual sensitivity toward the
psychological and emotional difficulties a child may face if he is taken from
a third party with whom he has lived for a long period and to whom he has
become attached.' 3' These five "exceptional circumstances" are simply
factors which the "psychological parenthood" concept uses to ascertain the
welfare of the child. In other words, the Ross court's "exceptional
circumstances" equals (or nearly equals) factors affecting the child's best
interests. Yet the Ross court failed to analyze how its formula for the
parental preference doctrine works. The court's statement that the child's
best interests need not be examined unless exceptional circumstances
exist 132 is illogical because, in effect, a court must examine the child's best
interests to conclude that exceptional circumstances exist.
While invoking the biological parent presumption, several Court of
Appeals decisions have, in effect, applied a pure "best interests of the child"
test. For example, in Piotrowski v. State,133 Trenton v. Christ,34 and Ross v.
Hoffman, 35 the court observed that in each case the child had been cared for
by the third party from the time it was a baby, that the child had lived with
the third party for approximately eight years, that the child preferred to stay
with the third party, and that the child exhibited substantial emotional
turmoil at the prospect of being separated from the third party. Such factors
are not weighted in favor of the parent, and invoking the parental
presumption in Piotrowski and Trenton was an empty gesture disguising a
custody determination based solely upon the best interests of the child.136
The increased willingness of the courts to protect the psychological best
Montgomery County Dep't of Social Serv. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 422-23, 381
A.2d 1154, 1164 (1978).
129. 280 Md. 172, 191, 372 A.2d 582, 593 (1977).
130. These two factors are indicative of the courts' continued reluctance to deny
custody to a parent who has not voluntarily abandoned his "parental rights." See
McClary v. Follett, 226 Md. 436, 439-41,174 A.2d 66, 68-69 (1961); GOLDSTEIN, FREUD
& SoLNrr, supra note 110, at 107-08; cf. Powers v. Hadden, 30 Md. App. 577, 584-87,
353 A.2d 641, 645-47 (1976) (decision for mother over paternal grandparents based in
part on fact that separation of child from mother resulted from "involuntary" divorce
decree).
131. See, e.g., Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 188-89, 148 A.2d 387, 389-90 (1959);
Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 422-23, 140 A.2d 660,662 (1958); Ross v. Pick, 199 Md.
341, 350-52, 86 A.2d 463, 468-69 (1952); Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 118-19,43
A.2d 186, 192-93 (1945); Piotrowski v. State, 179 Md. 377, 381-83, 18 A.2d 199, 200-02
(1941).
132. 280 Md. at 178-79, 372 A.2d at 587.
133. 179 Md. 377, 18 A.2d 199 (1941).
134. 216 Md. 418, 120 A.2d 660 (1958).
135. 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977).
136. As discussed at notes 129 to 131 and accompanying text supra, only five of the
seven factors examined by the Ross court affected the child's best interests.
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interests of the child is more apparent in cases in which both the third party
and the biological parent are equally fit, 13 7 than in cases in which the parent
seeking custody is either unfit or not as clearly fit as the third party.3 8 If a
parent is as capable of properly raising the child as is the third party, the
judicial task is more difficult than if the court could merely point to the
unfitness of the parent as a reason for awarding custody to the third party.
Thus, in Piotrowski and Trenton, by finding the parties equally fit and yet
still affirming an award of custody to the third party, the Court of Appeals
has exhibited considerable willingness to protect the psychological well-
being of the child.
A possible explanation for the weakness of the parental presumption,
and its virtual non-existence in some cases, is the concern of the Court of
Appeals that the best interests of the child be the paramount consideration
in custody cases. The parental presumption is assailable for the same reason
as the adultery presumption abandoned in Davis.139 As no basis exists for
presuming unfitness from the adultery of a parent, no basis exists in third
party-parent cases for presuming that the welfare of the child is served by
awarding custody to the biological parent.
Maryland's recently enacted legislation in the foster care/adoption field,
article 16, section 75, is a further example of Maryland's trend away from
the presumption favoring biological parents."40 In effect, the General
137. See Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 140 A.2d 660 (1958); Piotrowski v. State,
179 Md. 377, 18 A.2d 199 (1941).
138. See DeGrange v. Kline, 254 Md. 240, 254 A.2d 353 (1969); Melton v. Connolly,
219 Md. 184, 148 A.2d 387 (1959); Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 86 A.2d 463 (1952);
Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 43 A.2d 186 (1945).
139. See notes 32 to 41 and accompanying text supra.
140. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 75 (Cur. Supp. 1977), enacted in 1973, provides:
(a) After a child has been under continuous foster care for a period of two
consecutive years under the custody of an agency authorized by law to make
placements, it shall be presumed by the court that it is in the best interests of
the child to award to that agency a decree granting guardianship with the
right to consent to adoption or long term care short of adoption, without the
consent of the natural parent or parents; provided that notice otherwise
required by law has been given.
(b) The court in considering evidence to rebut this presumption, among
other factors, shall consider the following:
(1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his natural and
foster parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child's best interests;
(2) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(3) The mental and physical health of all individuals referred to in
subparagraph (1).
(c) Additionally, in order to rebut the presumption, the court shall require
substantial proof that:
(1) The natural parent will be able to resume his or her parental duties
within a reasonable period of time; or
(2) The natural parent has played a constructive role in the child's
welfare during the time he has been in foster care.
In evaluating the parent's role, the court may consider, among other
factors, (1) the frequency and regularity of personal contact with the child, (2)
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Assembly created an exception to the heavy burden of proof placed on
anyone seeking to adopt or to obtain guardianship of a child without the
consent of the biological parents. Article 16, section 75 creates a presump-
tion that if a child has been in continuous foster care for two years under the
custody of an authorized agency, the best interest of the child requires
granting guardianship to the agency with the right to consent to adoption or
long-term care without the consent of the biological parents. When it applies,
section 75 shifts the burden of proof from the agency to the parent.141 In
order to rebut the presumption, the parent must demonstrate by "substantial
proof" that he or she "will be able to resume his or her parental duties
within a reasonable period of time" or that he or she "has played a
constructive role [as defined in the statute] in the child's welfare during the
time he has been in foster care."'142
The trend in custody proceedings toward greater emphasis on the
psychological well-being of the child is not without exceptions. The courts
give less weight to the child's welfare and place greater emphasis upon
parental "rights" when the parent's relinquishment of custody was
involuntary. 143 The decisions follow a similar pattern when the parent has
permitted the state to place his or her child in a foster care home and later
seeks to regain custody. 144 In such cases the courts have emphasized the
demonstrated love and affection, (3) parental arrangement for the child's
future education and financial support, both in relation to the parent's means.(d) Nothing herein shall prevent a child under foster care from being
adopted pursuant to § 74 even if the period of continuous foster care is less
than two consecutive years.
141. Hicks v. Prince George's County Dep't of Social Serv., 281 Md. 93, 101-02, 375
A.2d 558, 563 (1977). Unfortunately, a presumption against biological parents in
situations to which article 16, section 75 applies is no more likely to reflect the best
interests of the child than is a presumption favoring biological parents in custody
disputes in which a third party has had custody for a long period. Section 75 merely
requires that a child be "under continuous foster care" for two years; apparently, the
presumption against biological parents applies even if the child has been in several
foster homes during the two years andhas not had a chance to develop meaningful
psychological ties with any of his foster families. Thus, at least as presently worded,
section 75 is an inadequate tool for protecting a child's best interests. Also, the statute
is an impediment to the commendable judicial trend away from the use of
presumptions in ascertaining a child's welfare.
142. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 75 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See note 140 supra.
143. See, e.g., McClary v. Follett, 226 Md. 436, 439-41, 174 A.2d 66, 68-69 (1961);
Montgomery County Dep't of Social Serv. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 422-23, 381
A.2d 1154, 1164 (1978); Powers v. Hadden, 30 Md. App. 577, 584-87, 353 A.2d 641,
645-47 (1976).
144. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845-47
(1977). Reducing the weight given to the best interests of the child and increasing that
given to the parent when the latter relinquished custody involuntarily or under an
agreement with the state has been criticized in Note, Foster Parent Standing in
Custody Modification Proceedings: Eason v. Welfare Comm'r, 9 CONN. L. REv. 496
(1977). See Powers v. Hadden, 30 Md. App. 577, 589-93, 353 A.2d 641, 648-50 (1976)
(Davidson, J., dissenting).
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contractual nature of the relationship between the parent and the state on
the one hand and the state and the foster parents on the other.
Assuming, however, that the parent has not involuntarily relinquished
custody and has not given up custody under an agreement with a social
services organization, Maryland courts are likely to give little actual weight
to the desires of the biological parents. The courts' primary concern is the
welfare, particularly the psychological welfare, of the child, 145 even though
the Ross test does not clearly reflect this concern. 146
CONCLUSION
Whether in the context of a divorce or a dispute between third parties
and parents, a custody case is an emotional, often bitter struggle between
adults. While it is settled that the best interest of the child, rather than that
of any adult, is the paramount consideration, the courts tend to give less
weight to the welfare of the child in two limited situations. 147 With the
increasing influence of psychology on custody disputes and the decreasing
reliance on or abandonment of some of the traditional presumptions, the
future of custody law in Maryland is uncertain. Maryland's abandonment of
the presumption of unfitness arising from adultery, and the decline and
probable demise of the tender years presumption, are indicative of a shift to
a case-by-case determination of a child's best interests. Indeed, the
application of such presumptions has proven difficult in light of the subtle
distinctions in facts and personalities from case to case. Although
abandonment of the presumption in favor of biological parents is
unlikely, 148 the courts, in practice if not by admission, will probably give
little or no weight to the presumption in most cases where the welfare of the
child requires placement with another party.
145. For discussion of why the child's interests should prevail over those of any
adult involved in a custody dispute, see GoLDsTEiN, FREUD, & SOLNrr, supra note 110,
at 105-11.
146. As a result of the increased awareness of the emotional and psychological
ramifications of a custody decision, courts, as evidenced by Ross v. Hoffman, rely
increasingly upon the advice of persons trained in the behavioral sciences. This
development has received considerable support. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS, supra note 65,
at 34-36 (remarks of Harry W. Fain); Foster & Freed, supra note 35, at 615-22; Kay &
Philips, supra note 31, at 722-26; Shepherd, supra note 2, at 171; Watson, supra note
48, at 74-76. In Levin, supra note 81, at 347, the author, a trial judge, observes:
While a judge may attempt to use common sense (and not all judges
possess this admirable quality) in custody decisions, he is not trained in the
behavioral or social sciences. A child's real needs may remain undetected by a
judge who, although well meaning, may disregard what is actually best for a
child by adopting a "common sense" approach (footnote omitted).
147. See notes 130, 143 & 144 and accompanying text supra.
148. See generally note 125 and accompanying text supra.
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